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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE



**SUMMARY**

**REPORT**

**OF**

**AUDIT**

SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM  
GROUND SUPPORT SYSTEM

28 JAN 80

(797433)

AIR FORCE AUDIT AGENCY

87-1080-AIR-040



REPORT SYNOPSISSPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM  
GROUND SUPPORT SYSTEMINTRODUCTION

1. The Space Transportation System (STS) concept of operations is a significant departure from past space programs in that it calls for the recovery, refurbishment, and reuse of most of the mission hardware. To meet these requirements within the DoD, a Ground Support System (GSS) is being established, primarily at Vandenberg AFB, California. The GSS will consist of facilities, hardware, software, and support functions necessary to receive, process, launch, and recover the space shuttle vehicle. It will also provide for the installation and removal of payloads flown and retrieved by the orbiter in support of both DoD and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) missions. NASA's shuttle launch and recovery facilities are located at the Kennedy Space Center, Florida. A major goal of the STS GSS program is to achieve commonality with NASA in terms of facilities, equipment, and procedures. Success in meeting this goal is affected by differences in missions between the Kennedy Space Center (equatorial) and Vandenberg AFB (polar), and the availability or lack of suitable existing facilities at both sites.

2. The Air Force is the designated agent for the DoD STS program. The Space Division Deputy for Space Launch Systems (SD/LV) manages the STS program with dedicated Air Force resources. In addition, Martin Marietta Corporation is responsible for GSS integration under a contract which became effective in June 1978.



PURPOSE AND SCOPE

3. Policies, procedures, and practices were reviewed to evaluate the overall effectiveness of GSS requirements identification, the adequacy of financial controls, and the soundness of planned procurement actions. Audit emphasis was placed on those factors which affected the validity and appropriateness of the fiscal year (FY) 1981 budget submission. We statistically sampled requirements for 60 ground support equipment (GSE) line items and tested them for reasonableness. Records reviewed were prepared 1976 - 1979. In order to accommodate an Air Staff request, we began the audit 4 months ahead of schedule. Audit application was also affected by a 6-month delay in the Vandenberg AFB initial launch capability date, which occurred during formulation of our audit approach. Audit work began in May 1979, and a draft of this report was provided to management in October 1979. This audit was accomplished at SD, the Sacramento Air Logistics Center, and Space and Missile Test Organization (SAMTO) activities at Vandenberg AFB, Patrick AFB, and the Kennedy Space Center. At the conclusion of the audit, two reports were issued to local management by the participating Air Force Audit Agency offices. A copy of this report is being provided to the Director of Budget for consideration of the impact of findings on the budget. Details concerning the scope of the audit, locations audited, time frames, and the Freedom of Information Act are provided in TAB D.

FINDINGS

4. Generally, policies, procedures, and practices related to GSS requirements, acquisition planning, and financial management were satisfactory. Considering the



broad scope of the STS program, the significant demand on personnel resources, and the continual need to seek improvements and respond to changes in direction, program management was very effective. However, the dynamic nature of the program contributed to certain conditions which required increased management attention and appropriate action.

a. AFSC needed to improve procedures and practices for processing GSS equipment requirements to AFLC. In addition, the HQ USAF office of primary responsibility for AFR 67-19, Logistics Support of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Activities, had not clarified the applicability of the directive to acquisition programs such as the STS GSS. (TAB A)

b. STS program office management had not decided how they would use FY 1980 missile procurement (3020) funds (\$41.6 million for GSE) for which the requirement had migrated to the out years. In addition, cost estimates for 5 of 10 FY 1981 GSS construction projects were escalated for inflation at a 10 percent rate rather than at the OSD-approved rate of 5.9 percent. As a result, the cost estimates reflected \$2.9 million more than would have been derived using the prescribed rate. (TAB B)

c. Conditions correctable at the program office level but requiring higher-level management visibility included budgeting for items which may not require STS program funding, and using outdated and unvalidated escalation rates; insufficient documentation of actions taken in response to NASA lessons learned, GSE requirements changes, and computer resource action items; and inadequate procedures for forecasting and revising equipment requirements. (TAB C)



RECOMMENDATIONS

5. We made six recommendations to HQ USAF and HQ AFSC to improve procedures for forecasting equipment requirements for acquisition programs and to resolve the disparity between budget requests for funds and GSS requirements. Our recommendations were primarily directed toward:

a. Clarifying and strengthening AFSC policies and procedures for forecasting equipment requirements to AFLC.

b. Reevaluating the need for AFR 67-19 and, if retained, revising it to include clarification of applicability to acquisition programs.

c. Evaluating program office plans for eliminating the disparity between FY 1980 and 1981 funds requested in the budgets and GSE requirements.

d. Strengthening procedures used in developing cost estimates for military construction projects.

MANAGEMENT ACTION


6. We provided HQ USAF and HQ AFSC a draft of this report on 15 October 1979 and requested formal comments. Management concurred with all the findings and recommendations.



SRA 797433

EVALUATION OF MANAGEMENT ACTION

7. We consider the management actions taken or planned to be responsive to the findings and recommendations included in this report.

  
BERNARD A. GARDETTO, JR.  
Director of Acq/Log Systems  
Air Force Audit Agency

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TABs A thru D







FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS  
AND MANAGEMENT ACTION



FORECASTING EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTSBACKGROUND

1. Equipment authorization forecasts aid in formulating adequate budget and buy programs, and provide for timely supply support of future equipment requirements. The dated forecast equipment authorization data (DFAED) program is used to systematically plan, develop, and report requirements for AFLC-funded investment equipment needed 180 days or more in the future.
2. AFR 67-19, Logistic Support of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Activities, describes how DFAED procedures apply to RDT&E activities. Forecasted equipment requirements are sent to the command equipment management office (CEMO), where they are compiled and forwarded to the Sacramento Air Logistics Center (SM-ALC) for entry into the USAF Equipment Data Bank (C008). Data bank information, which is validated monthly, is provided AFLC inventory management specialists (IMSS) for acquisition and budget planning.
3. AFSC/AFLC Regulation 800-31, Government-Furnished Equipment/Contractor-Furnished Equipment (GFE/CFE) Selection Process, GFE Acquisition and GFE Management, issued in July 1979, discusses procedures for obtaining GFE to be made available to contractors for system integration. The directive provides for direct communication between the program office and the ALC regarding equipment requirements and availability. The Ground Support System (GSS) integration contractor uses Military Standard Requisitioning and Issue Procedures (MILSTRIP) to requisition GFE from ALCs.



SRA 797433

TAB A

#### FINDINGS

4. AFSC procedures and practices for ensuring equipment would be available from AFLC for the GSS required strengthening and clarification.

a. An initial DFAED forecast of 46 GSS equipment requirements, stock listed at approximately \$639,000, was not forwarded by the AFSC CEMO for entry into the C008 system. The forecast was received from the Space Transportation System (STS) program office in September 1978. According to CEMO personnel, the requirements were not transmitted due to problems with C008 system computer routines. Therefore, IMSS were unaware of the equipment requirements contained in the forecast, and related budget and acquisition plans had not been made. Consequently, GSS integration contractor requisitions for needed GFE either were not responded to by the ALC or were filled from stocks for which no GSS requirements were programmed.

b. The AFSC CEMO had not established procedures for resubmitting DFAED requirements monthly. CEMO personnel were unaware of the requirement to do so. Under the C008 system in effect at the time of our audit, any DFAED requirements in the data bank were dumped monthly and were not reloaded unless a resubmission was received. Lost requirements affect the validity of IMS budget/buy programs.



RECOMMENDATION NO. 1

5. HQ AFSC should implement procedures for ensuring DFAED equipment requirement forecasts are reviewed and forwarded to SM-ALC for inclusion in the C008 system. Further, established DFAED requirements should be resubmitted monthly.

MANAGEMENT ACTION

6. HQ AFSC provided the following statement of management action:

"Concur. A meeting was held at HQ AFLC on 16-18 October 1979 to discuss and refine OFAED/DFAED procedures. The old system was rescinded on 10 December 1979 and replaced with a new forecasting program, RCS: LOG-LOW(W)7702. New guidance is being prepared for distribution to AFSC field activities which will define DFAED and outline method of submission and format for input. In addition, AFSC/LGS will coordinate with AFSC/SDD to identify when and how DFAED versus AFSC/AFLCR 800-31 procedures will be used. This information will be included in the DFAED guidance to ensure application of appropriate procedures and elimination of duplication. (Estimated completion date: March 1980)"



TAB AFINDING

7. Command clarification was needed regarding appropriate procedures for forecasting GSS equipment requirements to AFLC. Two HQ AFSC offices were responsible for issuing guidance on equipment requirements. One, AFSC/LG, emphasized to program offices in May 1976 the need to use DFAED procedures. The other, AFSC/SDD, participated with AFLC in developing AFSC/AFLCR 800-31. AFSC/SDD personnel were not aware DFAED forecasts were being received by the CEMO. Conversely, the CEMO (AFSC/LGS) was not aware of the impact of AFSC/AFLCR 800-31 on equipment forecasting. Guidance in this directive appeared more appropriate to the STS program than DFAED procedures in that it eliminated the need for equipment forecasts to flow through the CEMO. Additionally, it established a direct line of communication with AFLC IMSS by which status information on equipment availability could be obtained. DFAED procedures did not provide for status reporting; consequently, the STS program office could not appropriately reduce GSS budget estimates because there was no assurance requirements would be met and funded by AFLC.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 2

8. HQ AFSC should clarify to the STS program office the appropriate procedures to be followed in establishing GSS equipment requirements with AFLC. This guidance should reflect coordination between AFSC/LGS and AFSC/SDD. Additionally, general guidance on the applicability of AFR 67-19 and AFSC/AFLCR 800-31 should be issued to all product divisions.



MANAGEMENT ACTION

9. HQ AFSC provided the following statement of management action:

"a. We concur with the above recommendation. AFR 67-19 and AFSC/AFLCR 800-31 have distinctly different applications. AFR 67-19 establishes policies and procedures for providing equipment and recoverable items (components of end items) to support research and development, testing or operational testing and evaluation. AFSC/AFLCR 800-31 applies to 'acquisition program management' (AFR 800-2) and is primarily concerned with system/subsystem programs in demonstration and validation, full scale engineering development, and production phases. However, there are gray areas that need further clarification. On 11 Dec 79, we distributed two SD/LG coordinated letters to provide interim direction: one to all AFSC product divisions more clearly defining the applicability of AFR 67-19 and AFSC/AFLCR 800-31, and the second to SD/LV (formerly SAMSO/LV) directing them to use the procedures in AFSC/AFLCR 800-31 to acquire standard equipment/government furnished equipment (GFE) to support the Space Transportation System (an acquisition program managed per AFR 800-2).

"b. Additionally we plan to update AFR 67-19 and AFSC/AFLCR 800-31 to more explicitly define their applicability and interrelationships. AFSC/LGSM is presently preparing recommended changes to AFR 67-19 in response to HQ USAF/LEYP message 291930Z Aug 79 'Review of AFR 67-19.' AFSC proposed changes will be provided by 28 Feb 80. SDD made an interim message change to AFSC/AFLCR 800-31 on 11 Dec 79 to clarify its applicability



SRA 797433

TAB A

in relation to AFR 67-19. This interim message change will also be incorporated into the basic regulation when it is revised."

FINDING

10. The Headquarters USAF office of primary responsibility for AFR 67-19 had not clarified the applicability of the directive to acquisition programs such as the STS-CSS. The directive, issued in June 1971, had not been reviewed for currency since 1975. Since then, other directives applicable to acquisition programs were issued. These included AFR 800-22, CFE vs GFE Selection Process, 30 August 1976, and related implementing guidance, AFSC/AFLCR 800-31, 13 July 1979. As a result, AFR 67-19 did not reference guidance which was more appropriate to program offices involved in forecasting requirements for GFE. Consequently, GFE acquisition may be impaired.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 3

11. HQ USAF/LEY should review AFR 67-19 and clarify the directive's applicability to acquisition programs. Further, alternative procedures for obtaining support equipment, such as those in AFR 800-22 and AFSC/AFLCR 800-31, should be referenced.



MANAGEMENT ACTION

12. HQ USAF/LEY provided the following statement of management action:

"AF/LEY concurs with the recommendation. By classified message, HQ USAF/LEYP, 291830Z Aug 79 (subject: Review of AFR 67-19), all major commands were requested to review this 1971 AFR and provide comments. Command review is underway and is expected to be completed by February 1980. Within 120 days of receiving the command comments, the AFR 67-19 will be either rescinded or a revised document prepared and distributed for command coordination. The revised document will include instructions clarifying the relationship of AFR 67-19 with the AFR 800 series and the AFSC/AFLCR series regulations."

EVALUATION OF MANAGEMENT ACTION

13. We consider the management actions planned (paragraphs 6, 9, and 12) to be responsive to the findings and recommendations in this tab.



TAB BBUDGETBACKGROUND

1. Fund requirements included in the budget estimate submittal (BES) for the Space Transportation System (STS) Ground Support System (GSS) are based on annual requirements developed from a program acquisition plan, a cost data report, facility specifications, and information from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the Space and Missile Test Organization, and the Space Division Directorate of Launch Base Operations (SD/LVV). The program acquisition plan is compiled by the GSS integration contractor, Martin Marietta Corporation (MMC). It shows requirements, by year, for ground support equipment (GSE) and software. The cost data report, another MMC product, contains related funds requirements by GSS station set and fiscal year (FY) for each major appropriation code.

2. Military Construction Program (MCP) documents to support the budget are prepared in accordance with guidance in the annual "call" letter from HQ USAF/LEE. MCP documentation submitted to HQ AFSC includes DD Forms 1391, Military Construction Project Data and AF Forms 1178, Program Cost Estimates for Budget Purposes. Cost estimates are extremely important as they are used by HQ USAF to analyze and validate information which may be included in MCP requirements presented to the Congress.



SRA 797433

TAB B

FINDING

3. STS program office management had not decided how they would use FY 1980 missile procurement (3020) funds (\$41.6 million for GSE) for which the requirements had migrated to the out years. This resulted when GSE acquisition actions planned for FY 1980 were delayed by changes in program direction which included a slip in the initial launch capability (ILC) date of 6 months. This ILC change, which occurred in February 1979, after the President's budget was presented to Congress, also caused FY 1981 GSE acquisition plans to exceed the FY 1981 BES amounts by \$44 million. STS program office management had not concluded how the disparity between funds and GSE requirements would be resolved; however, one of several alternatives being considered was to use FY 1980 funds to coprocure NASA-common GSE items early from Rockwell International, the prime shuttle contractor. The contractor's optimized schedule for producing shuttle GSE contained many items needed to satisfy FY 1982 GSE requirements. This would do little to eliminate the mismatch of funds versus requirements in FY 1981. In addition, early acquisition of GSE could generate added costs for storage, maintenance, security, and equipment modifications or obsolescence.

COMMENT

4. Our SD local report of audit recommended that use of FY 1980 funds for early coprocurement be preceded by a program office study of costs (e.g., for storage, maintenance, and modification) versus benefits (e.g., possible avoidance of production start-up costs). The



study should include consideration of the need to balance FY 1981 requirements with the FY 1981 budget estimate.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 4

5. HQ USAF/RDS should monitor the resolution of the disparity between funds and STS GSE requirements and provide direction, as appropriate.

MANAGEMENT ACTION

6. HQ USAF/RDS provided the following statement of management action:

"AF/RDS concurs with the recommendation to monitor this situation and provide appropriate direction. AF/RDS also concurs with the intent of the recommendations made regarding the use of FY80 funds for which requirements had migrated to later years. Because the VAFB IOC change occurred after submission of the President's FY80 budget, a portion of the FY80 requirements could be deferred to later years. FY81 missile procurement funding has been adjusted so that the sum of FY80 and FY81 requirements now equals the sum of FY80 and FY81 funding. While the analysis is still not final regarding early coprocurement of common equipment, indications at this time are that the most effective approach will be to procure equipment for the Vandenberg ground support system on the schedule dictated by GSS activation needs. This approach would eliminate the additional storage, maintenance, and modification costs (which are not



SRA 797433

TAB B

budgeted) resulting from early procurement; there would be a lower than desirable obligation rate of FY80 funds during the first year. However, obligations would reach a normal level early in FY81. Early coprocurement will still be considered for specific items of GSS equipment when it is economically advantageous to the Government. We will maintain a continuing overview of this situation and adjust our program direction as appropriate."

FINDING

7. Cost estimates for 5 of 10 FY 1981 GSS construction projects were escalated for inflation at a 10 percent rate rather than at the OSD-approved rate of 5.9 percent. As a result, the cost estimates reflected \$2.9 million more than would have been derived using the prescribed rate. The 10 percent factor was applied to projects deferred from FY 1980 to FY 1981. MCP documentation, forwarded to HQ AFSC by SD/DE in July 1979, did not show the higher rate was used. In August 1978, SD/DE presented to HQ AFSC suggestions for meeting FY 1980 MCP ceilings. These included the alternative of delaying certain projects and applying a 10 percent inflation factor; however, approval to use the higher rate was neither requested nor obtained.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 5

8. HQ USAF/LEE should:

a. Ensure FY 1981 MCP cost estimates for GSS facilities included in the budget submittal to OSD are



TAB B

escalated for inflation in accordance with prevailing direction. Use of inflation factors other than those approved by OSD should be clearly documented and adequately supported.

b. Include in annual MCP guidance to field activities direction to either use OSD-approved inflation rates or obtain, through appropriate channels, AF/AC approval for doing otherwise.

MANAGEMENT ACTION

9. HQ USAF/LEE provided the following statement of management action:

"a. AF/LEE concurs with the recommendation. AF/LEE granted verbal approval to use a 10 percent inflation factor for certain space transportation construction projects in the FY81 MCP based on economic conditions that existed in late 1978 and early 1979. In the future, we will appropriately document decisions of this nature.

"b. Revised MCP Guidance for FY82, which should be distributed to major commands in Feb 80, will contain instructions on the use of OSD-approved inflation rates. Included in the instructions will be procedures for obtaining approval to deviate from the OSD approved rates."



SRA 997433

TAB B

EVALUATION OF MANAGEMENT ACTION

10. We considered the management actions planned (paragraphs 6 and 9) to be responsive to the findings and recommendations in this tab.



SELECTED ASPECTS OF PROGRAM MANAGEMENTBACKGROUND

1. Throughout the audit, we observed and reported to operating personnel conditions which provided appropriate local commanders the opportunity to improve certain aspects of Space Transportation System (STS) Ground Support System (GSS) program management. Individually, these conditions were correctable at the product division; however, collectively, they warrant continued higher-level management attention to enhance effective program management.

FINDINGS2. Budget Estimates.

a. The fiscal year (FY) 1981 Budget Estimate Submittal (BES) included \$4.95 million for support equipment which may not require STS program funding. Potentially, these requirements may be satisfied from Vandenberg AFB resources and/or Air Force inventory; however, they were included in the GSS BES because assurance that the items would be available and funded from other sources was not formalized.

b. The 15 June 1979 cost data report prepared by Martin Marietta Corporation (MMC) contained estimated costs which were adjusted to the base year (FY 1975) using outdated escalation rates. The base year cost



SRA 797433

TAB C

estimates were overstated for line items added to the cost data book since August 1978. Program office personnel had not provided current escalation rates to the contractor.

c. The 120 percent rate used by MMC to estimate costs for installing ground support equipment (GSE) installation systems was not validated. Any overstatement/understatement in the rate would directly affect current and future budget submittals.

3. Documentation.

a. Documentation was not always available to support actions taken in response to National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) lessons learned, GSE requirements changes, and status of computer resource action items. Consequently, the management trail for tracing actions was incomplete.

b. Many station set and facility development specifications were out of date, thereby providing unreliable data to users. Change notices were either missing or incorrectly posted to specifications.

4. Logistics.

a. Program office procedures for forecasting support equipment requirements to AFLC activities were not adequate. Forecasts were not revised, and there were no provisions to do so. As a result, problems may develop in acquiring GSE to meet time-phased requirements.

b. The GSS integration contractor had been directed to cite a draft table of allowances (TA) on STS support equipment requisitions to air logistics centers (ALCs).



The TA, which was not an appropriate allowance source document, was developed and was being maintained with the assistance of the Sacramento ALC. There were no plans to formally issue the TA which was being used as a list of support equipment required for the GSS. Citing an improper allowance source code could delay the requisitioning process.

c. Informal procedures had been established between the program office and the contractor for identifying support equipment requirements which could be satisfied from government inventory. Support equipment recommendation data (SERD) provisions in current directives were not included in the GSS integration contract per a Space Division (SD) staff recommendation. The lack of contractual coverage resulted in the government having no control over the frequency and format of contractor recommendations for government-furnished equipment/contractor-furnished equipment.

d. SD goals of developing uniform procedures for acquiring GSE and simplifying, standardizing, and promoting common usage were not being achieved. A Support Equipment Evaluation Group, formed in 1977, had not functioned effectively.

e. Program office funds (\$16,800), instead of AFLC funds, were used to acquire three centrally procured (CP) items which could not be supplied from ALC stock. The GSS integration contractor was not issued appropriate instructions; therefore, AFLC funds were not requested from the inventory management specialist to finance local purchase of the CP items.



TAB C

5. Acquisition.

a. Acquisition of launch processing system test equipment, originally needed in December 1978, was impeded by delays, errors, and misrouted requisitions. Known requirements for this equipment were not submitted to the GSS integration contractor until 4 months after the GSS integration contract was issued in June 1978. The contractor was then directed to process Military Standard Requisitioning and Issue Procedures (MILSTRIP) requisitions for some local purchase items, further delaying appropriate acquisition action. Subsequently, ground support equipment activation orders (GSEAOs) were prepared by the contractor in order to obtain test equipment through local purchase. GSEAOs submitted by the contractor on 31 January 1979 were contractually authorized on 28 February 1979; however, a second group of GSEAOs submitted to the program office in March 1979 was not formally approved by the procuring contracting officer until 20 August 1979.

b. In our opinion, plans for acquiring sewing machines for the parachute refurbishment facility were not well conceived. STS baseline documentation indicated the program office would acquire virtually the same machine models and quantities as obtained for the parachute facility at the Kennedy Space Center. The Kennedy Space Center machines were old models (some from the 1930s) which were refurbished by NASA's parachute contractor. Following the same course as NASA could generate problems with maintenance and spare parts for these machines. Further, a requirement for two large machines primarily to accommodate two different cord sizes appeared questionable. The cord could be changed with little effort. Program documentation indicated the machines would be acquired through NASA; however, we



noted that DoD has extensive experience with parachute refurbishment, as well as established sources of supply for the needed machines.

c. The requirement for a tactical air navigation (TACAN) ground station, with an estimated value of \$250,000, was included in an equipment forecast submitted to HQ AFSC, even though the unit currently in use at Vandenberg AFB could satisfy STS needs. The GSS acquisition plan appropriately indicated the TACAN was a base support item which would be furnished by the host.

#### RECOMMENDATION NO. 6

6. HQ AFSC should ensure timely and effective corrective actions are initiated by the STS program manager in response to our local recommendations.

#### MANAGEMENT ACTION

7. HQ AFSC provided the following statement of management action:

"We concur with the above recommendation. We have reviewed the HQ SD/CS response to the AFAA Report of Audit 945-38, dated 20 Sep 79. The action taken or planned to date by the Product Division is appropriate. However, continued management attention is required on several findings to assure timely and satisfactory conclusions. HQ AFSC/SDS will monitor these findings and proposed HQ SD/LV actions to assure satisfactory results."



SRA 797433

TAB C

EVALUATION OF MANAGEMENT ACTION

8. We consider the management action planned (paragraph 7) to be responsive to the findings and recommendation in this tab.



SCOPE, LOCATIONS AUDITED, TIME PERIOD, AND  
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

1. SCOPE OF AUDIT. The overall objective of this audit was to evaluate policies, procedures, and practices related to Space Transportation System Ground Support System requirements, acquisition planning, and financial management. We placed particular emphasis on those factors which affected the validity and appropriateness of the fiscal year 1981 budget submission. Specifically included were reviews of the following:

a. The appropriateness of planned procurement actions for the requirements identified.

b. The adequacy and effectiveness of financial controls, including budgeting and funding for present and future requirements.

c. The reasonableness of requirements identified for support equipment, software, and facilities.

2. LOCATIONS AUDITED:

<u>Location</u>	<u>Activity Audited</u>	<u>Local Reports Issued</u>
<u>Air Force Systems Command</u>		
Los Angeles AFS CA	Space Division (SD)	945-38, 20 Sep 79
Vandenberg AFB CA	Space and Missile Test Organization (SAMTO)	472-25, 19 Jul 79



SRA 797433

TAB. D

<u>Location</u>	<u>Activity Audited</u>	<u>Local Reports Issued</u>
Patrick AFB FL	SAMTO Det 1	No report issued
	6555th Aerospace Test Group (ASTG)	No report issued
Kennedy Space Center FL	6555th ASTG/SL	No report issued

Air Force Logistics Command

McClellan AFB CA	Sacramento Air Logistics Center	No report issued
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3. TIME PERIOD OF AUDIT. The audit was started in May 1979, and a draft of this report was provided to management in October 1979..

4. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT.

a. The office of primary responsibility (OPR) for this report is HQ USAF/RD. The offices of collateral responsibility (OCRs) are HQ USAF/LE and HQ AFSC.

b. The OPR disclosure/denial authority prescribed in AFR 12-30, paragraphs 12 and 13, and AFR 175-4, paragraph 9, in coordination with the OCRs, will make all decisions relative to release of this report to the public.



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